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Introduction 
 
Developing long term relations with other countries in the world and promoting a set of 
important objectives and norms (such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and good 
governance, free market economy) are at the heart of EU diplomacy. This policy brief 
examines these dimensions of EU diplomacy from a wider perspective and highlights what 
this brand of diplomacy is really about: influencing the ‘rules of the game’ or ‘structures’ in 
third countries and other regions.  
 
We label this diplomacy as ‘structural diplomacy,’ a process of dialogue and negotiation 
with third countries aimed at sustainably influencing or shaping political, legal, economic, 
financial, social, security and/or other structures in target countries.iThere are two key 
aspects of ‘structural diplomacy’. 
 
Firstly, the objective is to influence or shape structures. These structures consist of 
organizing principles that shape and order the political, legal, socio-economic and security 
fields (e.g., ‘free market economy’ or ‘democracy’). The operationalization and institutional 
setup of these organizing principles can take different forms, though, allowing for 
differentiation and variation adapted to the specific context of each region, country or 
society.  
 
Secondly, the objective is to produce sustainable effects. The purpose of the process of 
dialogue and negotiation is to influence or shape structures in such a way that these 
affected structures obtain an enduring character and become relatively permanent, 
including when the external support or involvement has disappeared. In other words, the 
purpose is not just to pursue changes, but also to pursue structural changes. 
 
Successful examples of structural diplomacy are the EU’s diplomacy towards the Central 
and Eastern European countries and, in general, the Balkan region. However, the EU’s 
structural diplomacy proves less effective or less easy with regions and countries to which 
the EU cannot offer potential EU membership as the ultimate reward for the pursuit of 
structural changes (such as the countries that are part of the European Neighbourhood 
policy or the Arab world in general). This is problematic for the EU as it is increasingly 
confronted with other actors in these regionsii (such as Russia, China, or Islamic 
movements supported by Saudi Arabia) that conduct their own strong structural diplomacy 
in function of promoting their rules of the game. 
 
The purpose of this policy paper is to illuminate some challenges of structural diplomacy 
and to formulate concrete recommendations for the EU’s diplomatic system, including not 
only the European External Action Service, but also other European and national actors 
involved in EU diplomacy. The policy paper draws on the research conducted in the 
framework of the Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Project on ‘The EU as a Diplomatic 
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Actor’iii with regard to two specific case studies: the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovoiv 
and security sector reform (SSR) policies in DR Congov. It will also include evaluations and 
recommendations that have a wider relevance, notably for the EU’s current structural 
diplomacy efforts in the Arab world. 
 
Comprehensiveness 
 
A first major lesson is the crucial importance of a comprehensive approach, an essential 
requirement for achieving lasting and sustainable effects. Comprehensiveness implies that 
the EU’s structural diplomacy has to take into account the overlapping nature of the 
structures in various relevant, interrelated sectors (political, legal, social, economic, 
financial, security, etc.) and levels (the state, individual, societal, regional and global 
levels). Structures in various sectors and on various levels are not isolated from each 
other, but are closely interconnected, and this demands a cross-sectional analysis. 
 
Two examples of the EU’s rule of law and security sector reform missions can illustrate 
this. Both examples illuminate the close connection between the security sector and the 
economic and financial structures; both also highlight that focusing on state structures is 
not sufficient in view of the interconnectedness between these structures and the 
individual and international levels.  
 
The first example is the EU’s support for security sector reform in DR Congo and for the 
reform of the police structures through the CSDP mission “EUPOL DR Congo.” An analysis 
of the broader context of this mission points to the valuable (and often underestimated) 
role of this CSDP mission, for instance through its advisory role in the drafting process of 
new police legislation by the Congolese authorities. However, research demonstrates that 
important dimensions of the police reform (such as the creation of civilian oversight 
mechanisms and the financial aspects of the police reform) were, in general, subordinate 
to the traditional police reform projects. While the latter consist mainly of technical 
interventions in the short term, a structural reform requires a wider set of instruments. 
What is not tackled, and what is at this moment beyond the scope of the EU’s involvement, 
are state level administrative, financial and budgetary structures (cf. the lack of effective 
financial and administrative ‘chain of payment’ systems necessary to guarantee the 
payment of the salaries, and the limited revenues in the budget of the DR Congo). The 
limited revenues are also related to the problematic international trade and security 
structures that stem from the excavation of raw materials in East Congo. 
 
The second example, the EU’s CSDP rule of law mission “EULEX Kosovo”, is an example 
of a quite comprehensive approach, as it focuses on the interrelated police, judicial, and 
border management structures. Improved functioning of the police structures and a better 
handling of criminality by police forces can have only limited effects without structural 
reform of the judicial system to assure courts deal effectively with criminal cases. The EU, 
however, neglected some important dimensions at particularly the start of the rule of law 
mission, including the problem posed by police officer and judge’s low salaries. Such 
neglect undermined the potentially positive effects of the EU’s efforts. This issue is related 
to the economic and financial structures of Kosovo, due to the strict budgetary limitations 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank on the government in Pristina. Whereas many EU 
actors initially regarded the salary problem as irrelevant, the European Commission 
together with other international actors launched a vetting process that included a (still 
limited) increase of salaries of judges.  
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The previous examples indicate that, in most cases, pursuing structural changes in one 
sector and on one level requires that the structures in other sectors/levels are taken into 
account and that structural changes must also be pursued in other relevant sectors/levels. 
It is evident that the EU is not able to tackle all relevant structures. Because of the 
overlaps between sectors and levels, European diplomats and civil servants should though 
at least evaluate to what extent the EU’s diplomacy takes into account the 
interconnectedness of the various dimensions of a policy problem to create an effective 
structural diplomacy. This points to the importance of the following two challenges: 
coordination and alignment   
 
Coordination. 
 
Comprehensiveness as a requirement of effective structural diplomacy implies that a 
division of labour between many international actors is normal. This underlines the 
importance of coordination between the actors involved within and among the EU 
institutions, with the EU member states, and with other international organizations.  
 
Effective coordination between EU actors (the various actors within the EEAS, the EU 
Delegations, DG DEVCO, other DG’s in the Commission, etc.) is a first requirement to 
achieving a comprehensive approach, as is coordination of the wide array of policy 
instruments available to the EU.vi The need for greater coordination in the Brussels arena 
and in the field has also been painfully clear in the EU’s policy with regard to both DR 
Congo and Kosovo. The two case studies indicate that each EU actor often concentrates 
on the realization of individual projects without taking into consideration the general scope 
of the required structural reforms. In the case of police reforms in Congo, the problematic 
relationship between the CSDP missions and the Union Delegation (previously 
Commission Delegation) resulted in a context where the required coordination was either 
very limited or totally absent. Moreover, while it is expected that the EU Delegation 
assumes the general coordination, the EUPOL mission did not accept this oversight. At the 
same time, the mission was not provided with sufficient financial and technical resources 
to realize its programme. It is in this context that a full integration of the CSDP missions 
within the EU Delegation is required – which though also implies that the functioning of the 
EU Delegations takes into account the specific nature of ESDP missions. 
 
At least as important but receiving much less attention is the recognition that member 
states play a major role in many foreign policy issues. Financial and other resources and 
the political leverage and credibility of the member states (and of NGOs or development 
agencies from these member states) can be equal to or substantially higher than that of 
the EU. This explains why it is not always logical to expect the EEAS in Brussels or the EU 
Delegation in third countries to be at the heart of EU coordination. Explicitly recognizing 
the major role of some member states and providing them with a lead function in terms of 
coordination (and if useful in rotation with other member states and with the EU Delegation 
in the context of regular EU Heads of Mission meetings) can prove to be more functional 
than trying to always centralize coordination within the EU Delegation.  
 
The comprehensive nature of structural diplomacy also explains why the involvement of 
and coordination with other relevant third countries and international organisations is 
required. Important in this context is that the EU not only coordinates with its traditional 
partners (i.e. other Western countries or global organisations), but also with other relevant 
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regional powers or neighbouring countries, even if the EU is not used to work together with 
them. Managing the division of labour among different international actors certainly 
presents a major task for the EEAS and EU Delegations. 
 
Alignment 
 
The most important component of coordination is also the most often forgotten: alignment. 
More broadly, this refers to coordination with the relevant domestic actors in the third 
country that is subject or recipient of the EU’s structural diplomacy.  ‘Alignment’ is a major 
principle in the field of development cooperation but it is also highly relevant in the field of 
diplomacy and foreign policy. It implies that a foreign policy actor first aligns its policy as 
much as possible with the policies, priorities and contexts of the target country and 
second, that it fits its activities as much as possible within the existing institutional 
frameworks and procedures of the third country. What is needed is thus an “outside-in 
approach,” which does not take the European or Brussels context as the main point of 
departure, but centers on the endogenous context of the third country.  
 
The challenge for EU structural diplomacy is to try to avoid the development or use of a 
parallel system (with measures and policies being implemented and realized by 
international organisations, NGO’s, or consultancies), and to make use of and strengthen 
existing institutions and procedures of a country. To take into account the specific 
endogenous context of the third country is a principal challenge, as they are often 
characterized by weak governmental, administrative and financial structures. Thus, 
adapting policies to these contexts by at least initially downgrading the level of ambition 
and sophistication (and the related administrative burden) is imperative when 
implementing policies. This can lead to better results than when applying the EU’s own 
high standards, sophisticated approaches and ‘best practices’ to a context where the EU’s 
goals are inconsistent with existing structures. Here, achieving a ‘minimum-level of 
practices’ may already be a achievement.  
 
The EULEX activities in Kosovo provide an example of minimal alignment. EU goals in 
regard to the police component too often neglected measures that had been set out in 
Kosovan sector-specific national strategic policy documents. In terms of capacity building, 
if the EU had acknowledged and built upon what already existed by supporting the 
implementation of policies adopted by the government, it would have promoted ‘learning 
by doing’ and increased the chance of sustainable changes, even if this would imply some 
uncertainty and possibly even failures in the short term. 
 
The lack of alignment between external programmes and endogenous processes and 
structures is also clear in the EU’s policies in the DR Congo. EU actors often implement 
projects according to European frameworks and concepts that do not correspond to the 
Congolese socio-economic realities and needs. As a result the Congolese authorities and 
population do not always support these policies. One example illustrates this. The EU 
wants to restructure the police system in DR Congo on the basis of the European 
principles of “proximity police.” However, it is questionable whether this can be achieved 
within the specific context of the DR Congo as its police forces include former combatants 
(and thus engender fear among parts of the population), have very limited budgetary 
resources, have inadequate or simply absent equipment for policemen, and are subject to 
very bad road infrastructure.  
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Learning - Dialogue  
 
The need to adopt a comprehensive and cross-sectorial approach and to take into account 
the specific endogenous context of the third country points to another major challenge for 
EU structural diplomacy: upgrading the position of ‘learning’ and ‘dialogue’ within the EU’s 
diplomatic system and activities. An effective structural foreign policy requires a broad, in-
depth understanding of the endogenous context in the third country (relevant endogenous 
actors, enabling and prohibiting factors and processes, values, traditions, sensitivities, 
etc). 
 
This implies that the EU’s diplomats and civil servants need to be able to rely not only on 
excellent generalist or specialists in specific policy fields (such as police reforms), but also 
on area specialist with a sound knowledge of the third country, long-term experience in 
these countries, and a solid network of contacts within these countries. What the EEAS 
and the EU delegations need are not just diplomats or civil servants specialized in the 
EU’s policy towards the Balkans and Central Africa, but specialists in the Balkans and the 
DR Congo.  
 
Though the recruitment policy of the EEAS has until now focused on finding a balanced 
mix of excellent diplomats and civil servants from the various EU institutions and member 
states, priority should now be given to experts specialized in non-European countries and 
societies, which is essential for overcoming an EU’s diplomatic approach that is too 
Western ethnocentric and too EU-centric. Or to take two other major fields of interest in the 
EU’s diplomacy, the EEAS and the EU delegations need not only experts in EU-China 
relations or in the EU’s Mediterranean policies, but China-specific specialists and 
specialists in the Arab societies when dealing with China or the Arab world. 
 
A sound knowledge of the third country also allows the EU diplomats and civil servants to 
enter into a more profound dialogue with the partners in the third country, which in its turn 
will contribute to complementing the ‘EU perspective’ with a ‘third country perspective’. 
This will help to avoid the EU taking for granted the paradigms which constitute the basis 
of the EU’s diplomatic approaches and neglecting paradigms or policy priorities of the 
partner countries.  
 
Policy recommendations 
 
This policy paper analyses the EU’s diplomacy from the point of view of its potential 
structural impact on third countries and regions. For that purpose, we introduce the 
concept ‘structural diplomacy’: the process of dialogue and negotiation with third countries 
aimed at influencing or shaping in a sustainable way political, legal, economic, financial, 
social, security and/or other structures in these countries. The analysis leads to the 
following policy recommendation for the diplomatic system of the EU: 
 
 High-ranking officials within the EEAS as well as the Heads of Mission of the EU 
Delegations should receive the explicit task to look at the EU’s long-term relations 
and partnerships with third countries from a structural diplomacy perspective. 
They systematically try to take into account the requirements regarding 
comprehensiveness, coordination, alignment, learning and dialogue in order to 
increase the legitimacy and chances of success of the EU’s diplomatic efforts. 
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 The EU must adopt a comprehensive approach that recognizes the 
interconnectedness between the structures in various relevant sectors (political, 
legal, social, economic, financial, security, etc.). A cross-sectorial approach is 
needed to avoid the neglect of some policy sectors undermining potential successes in 
other related sectors. Equally important is to focus not only on the state level but also 
on the related individual, societal or international level. 
 
 Comprehensiveness underlines the importance of cooperation between the various 
relevant actors, within and among the EU institutions as well as with the EU member 
states, other third actors, and other international organizations. The EU’s diplomatic 
system should recognize the often-crucial role of individual EU member states as well 
as of other third countries in this context, including countries with which the EU has no 
strong tradition of cooperation. 
 
 The EU should take seriously the most forgotten component of coordination: 
coordination with the relevant actors in the third country that is subject of the EU’s 
structural diplomacy. Following the principle of alignment, the EU must align its 
policy as closely as possible to the policies, priorities and contexts of that third 
country in attempt to fit its activities within existing institutional frameworks and 
processes of the third country (even if this requires from the EU to lower its level of 
ambition and sophistication). 
 
 Because the difference between the political, legal, economic and societal contexts in 
Europe and other regions in the world is quite large, the EU must make greater efforts 
to adapt the EU’s policies and methods to the specific endogenous contexts 
within third countries, in order to avoid a complete misfit. An effective and relevant 
structural diplomacy cannot consider the exportation of European structures and norms 
as a standard operating procedure. These structures do not constitute ‘passe-partouts’ 
and cannot be applied everywhere or in all circumstances without adaptation. 
 
 The EU should enter more systematically into two-directional dialogue with third 
countries. Such dialogues will ferment in-depth understanding of the contexts and the 
real priorities of the partner countries while demonstrating more convincingly that the 
structures promoted by the EU are indeed in the interest of the partner countries.  
 
 A major objective of the recruitment policy of the EEAS should be to attract top 
experts on China, Asia, the Arab world, Islam, etc. This is pertinent in order to 
further strengthen the expertise available to the EEAS and the EU Delegations as well 
as to overcome the often too EU-centric or Western ethnocentric perspective on non-
European countries. 
 
 Strengthening the effectiveness and external legitimacy of the EU’s structural 
diplomacy and taking into account more the specific interests and endogenous 
contexts of third countries must become a EU priority. This is important in view of the 
competing structural diplomacies conducted by actors such as Russia, China, or 
Islamic movements supported by Saudi Arabia. This is particularly urgent as these 
actors promote structures that are quite different to those promoted by the EU, but that 
are nevertheless perceived by parts of the population and elites in third countries as 
more effective and more adapted to their situation. 
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The Diplomatic System of the EU Network, funded by the European Commission’s Jean 
Monnet Programme, brings together three partner universities with a strong tradition in the 
study of European integration in its international context. The lead partner is Loughborough 
University, and specifically its Department of Politics, History and International Relations and 
Centre for the Study of International Governance. The other partners are the University of 
Leuven, from Belgium, and Maastricht University, from the Netherlands. Each partner is 
responsible for key events and a research strand. In addition selected experts drawn from 
EU and Member State institutions and from relevant sections of civil society will be invited to 
participate in selected network activities. 
 
Nothing in this paper should be construed as representing the views of any EU or national 
institution, including those represented in the network itself. For further information about the 
network and its activities, please visit http://dseu.lboro.ac.uk 
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